The verdict on the
appeal by the Metric Martyrs over their criminal convictions for using lb/oz
was delivered on February 18th, 2002 at the Royal Courts of Justice, London.
After three months of deliberation, Lord Justice Laws and Mr Justice Crane
ruled against the five traders and their legal representative, Michael
Shrimpton.
Lord Justice Laws
and Justice Crane entered the Court at 9.07am. Lord Justice Laws apologised for
the judgement taking so long, saying that points had occurred to the Court
that, had they proved good, would have assisted the defendants. Their Lordships
had sought further submissions from the parties but, in the event, the points
did not prove good. Lord Justice Laws said that for reasons given in the
written judgement, the appeals were being dismissed.
There were three
issues to be dealt with by the Court that morning: providing answers to
questions raised in the case; matters of costs; and a further appeal to the
House of Lords.
On the first point,
the judges considered it wasteful to address every question raised in the case
and decided to address the general point: were the metric regulations valid or
not? For reasons given in the written judgement, they held that the regulations
were valid.
On the matters of
cost, Lord Justice Laws heard submissions from lawyers representing local
authorities who argued that since the traders had chosed to appeal their
convictions, they had exposed themselves to further costs. They said that local
authorities had no choice but to apply the law and should not be expected to
pay the bill. They further said that costs should be made against the Metric
Martyr Defence Fund which existed to support the traders.
Michael Shrimpton,
defending the traders, argued that there should be no order for costs against
the traders for four reasons:
i) It was pertinent
that each of the local authorities had chosen traders of limited means but not
any of the supermarkets that broke metric regulations. Mr Shrimpton said that
the local authorities had the opportunity to ensure equality of arms by
proceeding against supermarkets but proceeded where there was no
equality.
ii) The appeal had
been of enormous constitutional importance and went beyond weights and
measures. Mr Shrimpton said that it raised issues aurrounding the 1972 EC Act
that should not have been left until 30 years after Britain had entered the EU;
therefore, funding the case should be a matter for central government, not
individuals or ratepayers.
iii) Costs should
be assessed by reference to the defendant's means.
iv) Mr Shrimpton
pointed out that the Appeal, while lost, had been successful on a number of the
points that it had sought to argue; for instance, the 1985 Weights and Measures
Act meant what it said when it permitted imperial units.
Lord Justice Laws
remarked that the traders, "did not have to come here [the appeal court]". Mr
Shrimpton said that the appeal process was an entitlement. However, the judges
ruled against Mr Shrimpton and held that the defendents should pay the costs of
the Appeal. These costs would not be reduced. They said that the defendents had
proceeded to Appeal and were aware of the costs if unsuccessful.
On the final matter
of appealing to the House of Lords, Lord Justice Laws said he would certify one
question of public importance, namely, "Is the 1972 European Communities Act
capable of being impliedly repealed by latter
legislation?"
The
Verdict
The appeals were
dismissed for reasons that can be summarised as following:
Implied
Repeal With respect to the arguments for implied repeal, the judges ruled
that there was no inconsistency between Section 1 of the 1985 Act and Section
2(2) of the 1972 Act because there could be no inconsistency between a
provision conferring a Henry VIII power to amend future legislation and the
terms of that future legislation. In making provision for future amendment,
Parliament was not binding its successors, since its successors could legislate
as they chose in the face of the clause.
The judges also
held that common law had come to recognise that there are certain acts that are
constitutional. There was thus a "hierarchy" of Acts of Parliament, that is,
ordinary statutes and constitutional statutes. While ordinary acts may be
impliedly repealed, constitutional acts cannot and can only be repealed by
express words. The 1972 EC Act was such a constitutional
statute.
Henry VIII
Clauses With regards to the defendants' arguments against the use of Henry
VIII clauses, the judges was held that Section 2(4) of the EC Act clearly
intended to give means of implementing a Directive by means of secondary
legislation made under Section 2(2). The judges therefore held that the EC Act
Section 2(2), read with Section 2(4), applied in the case of the metric
regulations. The judges rejected references by the defendants to ministerial
assurances given in 1972 as to the EC Act's limitations; the EC Act was
sufficiently clear without need to refer to minister's
statements.